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JUDICIAL FACTFINDING IN AN AGE OF RAPID CHANGE: 
CREATIVE REFORMS FROM ABROAD 
Allison Orr Larsen 
Very few judges have degrees in neuroscience, experience with 
complex financial transactions, or skill with deciphering statistical 
methodology.  Yet questions involving complicated issues like these are 
increasingly landing on the desks of American judges.  The U.S. Su-
preme Court, for example, has recently discussed at length the effect of 
video games on child brain development,1 molecular biology and the 
patentability of genetic information,2 and studies from sociologists 
claiming that affirmative action both does and does not stigmatize mi-
nority students.3  How is a generalist judge supposed to answer these 
complicated — and often unknowable — questions of fact? 
Traditionally, of course, judges in the United States are educated 
about the issues they must decide through trial and expert witnesses.  
But times have changed.  The internet provides a revolutionary new 
tool for members of the judiciary at all levels (trial courts and appel-
late courts) to address these so-called “legislative facts” on their own.4  
Social science studies, raw statistics, and other data are now all just a 
Google search away.  And increasingly amicus curiae (“friend of the 
court”) briefs offer factual information to judges beyond what the par-
ties can provide.5  At bottom, the notion of expertise is changing — 
both within the legal system and in the world at large.  Experts are 
now everywhere.  And as the factual dimensions of controversies grow 
more complex and technology provides a tempting way to learn about 
them outside the record, judges now find themselves in a tough spot.  
On the one hand, turning to claims not tested by the adversarial pro-
cess risks infecting judicial opinions with unsubstantiated claims;6 on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 800–01 (2011). 
 2 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013). 
 3 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2213–14 (2016); id. at 2231–33 (Alito, 
J., dissenting). 
 4 A “legislative fact” — a phrase coined by Kenneth Culp Davis in 1942 — is a generalized 
fact about the world as opposed to a “whodunit” fact about what happened in any one case.   
Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 71 & n.57 (2013) (discussing  
Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942)). 
 5 See Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1760–62 
(2014). 
 6 Id. at 1800–02; see also Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial 
Notice in the Information Age, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1137, 1139 (2014) (arguing “that the ease of 
accessing factual data now available on the Internet will allow judges and litigants to expand the 
 
  
2017] JUDICIAL FACTFINDING 317 
the other hand, ignoring available information even in the face of lop-
sided party resources could, in the words of Judge Posner, “heart-
less[ly] . . . make a fetish of [the] adversary procedure.”7  Neither op-
tion seems ideal. 
These challenges are not just American challenges.  And perhaps 
we should be looking globally to find creative solutions to them.  In 
this Commentary I highlight two innovative ways to address the com-
plex relationship between generalist judges and increasingly special-
ized and fact-heavy litigation.  While no solution is perfect, the take-
home point should be the need to think creatively about how to ad-
dress the challenges that come with judging in the twenty-first century. 
COORDINATED AMICI 
Briefs from amici curiae — groups who are not parties to the litiga-
tion but are nonetheless interested in the result — are a growing tool 
for educating U.S. courts on questions of fact.  The statistics at the 
Supreme Court are dramatic — amicus participation has increased 
over 800% from the 1950s and 95% from 1995.8  And although interest 
groups file briefs for any number of reasons, the most applauded rea-
son is to address technical questions that the Justices are eager to learn 
about and the record is somehow inadequate to address.9  Convention-
al wisdom these days is that a successful venture at the Supreme Court 
requires assembling a slate of amici acting as factual experts. 
However, as I have fretted about before, there are reasons to be 
skeptical of facts that come from amicus briefs: these claims are gener-
ally submitted at the eleventh hour, untested by the adversarial system, 
and motivated by those with a dog in the fight.10  Although some ami-
ci surely provide reliable expertise to the Supreme Court, that is not 
universally true, and the risk is that the Justices will turn to briefs that 
simply confirm what they already believe to be true.  If courts rely too 
heavily on untested amicus experts, there is a risk of tainting the 
Court’s decisions with false facts and convenient science. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
use of judicial notice in ways that raise significant concerns about admissibility, reliability, and 
fair process”). 
 7 Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir. 2015).  But see id. at 636 (Hamilton, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (disputing the court’s use of “internet research”). 
 8 Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1902 (2016) 
(citing Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the 
Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 749 (2000)). 
 9 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial 
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 987 (2009); James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365, 366–67 
(1997). 
 10 Larsen, supra note 5. 
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Maybe there is a systematic way to sort the “good” amici experts 
from the “bad” ones — a way to provide expertise when needed, but to 
ensure that such experts truly merit that label.  Across the Atlantic, 
some clever legal thinkers have come up with one such strategy.  
P.R.I.M.E. Finance, established in 2012, is a Dutch nonprofit organiza-
tion whose name stands for “Panel of Recognised International Market 
Experts in Finance.”11  The goal of P.R.I.M.E. Finance is to “help re-
solve, and to assist judicial systems in the resolution of, disputes con-
cerning complex financial transactions.”12 
This innovative pilot program was born out of necessity.  Following 
the 2008 financial crisis, financial litigation was increasing steadily, 
and lawsuits were being brought more globally — no longer just in 
New York or London.  Courts around the world — facing what some 
called a “tsunami” of financial cases — were reaching different results 
with very similar facts.13  This led to “an immense black hole of legal 
uncertainty” and one with tremendous consequences in a global econ-
omy where rule stability is often the key to growth.14 
Why the disarray?  Jeffrey Golden, a leading arbitrator and fre-
quent expert witness in global derivatives and one of the founders of 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance, explains it simply: “The stuff is complicated.”15  
The new litigation, Golden explains, was asking judges to veer from 
issues and theories they were comfortable with (for example, contract 
formation and duty of care) and instead to deal with complex and 
“more technical issues, like flawed asset and anti-deprivation theories, 
mathematical modeling, formulaic calculations, and global insolvency-
proofing techniques.”16  What is more, the cases often turned on ques-
tions of fact about the global market and trade usages that are both 
hard to understand and in constant flux.  Of course the courts were 
muddled.  And this confusion, in turn, led to industry instability; “[t]he 
markets worry all the time: wrong place, wrong party, judges and law-
yers who would brief them who don’t get it.”17 
  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 About Us, P.R.I.M.E. FIN., http://primefinancedisputes.org/page/about-us [https://perma.cc 
/G8PG-KX9M]. 
 12 Gerard J. Meijer & Camilla M.L. Perera – de Wit, P.R.I.M.E. Finance: A New Dispute Res-
olution Facility for Conflicts Relating to Complex Financial Products, 14 BUS. L. INT’L 153, 153 
(2013); see also About Us, supra note 11. 
 13 Jeffrey Golden, Judges and Systemic Risk in the Financial Markets, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 327, 330 (2013). 
 14 Meijer & Perera – de Wit, supra note 12, at 154 (quoting David Baragwanath, How Should 
We Resolve Disputes in Complex International Financing Transactions?, 7 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 204, 
205 (2012)). 
 15 Golden, supra note 13, at 330. 
 16 Id. at 331 (footnote omitted). 
 17 Id. at 330. 
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So Golden and others came up with a solution.  They wanted to 
ensure that judges dealing with complex financial litigation were turn-
ing to the right people to learn what they needed to know, and so they 
decided to create “one-stop access to the best collective knowledge of 
law and market practice regarding derivatives and other complex fi-
nancial products.”18  With that, P.R.I.M.E. Finance was born.  Golden 
explains the group’s motivation with a metaphor: If you think of mar-
ket regulators as providing “preventive medicine,” then the goal of 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance is to educate the “hospitals” — the courts where 
financial market participants end up after a crash.19  P.R.I.M.E. Fi-
nance, he explains, seeks to ensure that the “‘hospitals’ . . . have 
enough qualified staff” to care for their patients.20  Thus the organiza-
tion, among other things, maintains a database of relevant publications 
and routinely provides technical training, support, and a ready pool of 
expert witnesses for the courts.  They have, in other words, come up 
with a way to channel expertise outside of the adversarial system. 
There is no reason this idea of one-stop shopping for judges hungry 
for specialized information must remain restricted to the field of fi-
nance.  Part of the justification for P.R.I.M.E. Finance is that the ad-
versary system is not equipped for these sorts of controversies, and 
judges have begun to admit what they do not know.  The same, of 
course, can be said of judges in the United States facing hard questions 
on medicine, social science, or technological innovations.  Digital ac-
cess to information has supplanted or at least supplemented the old 
way of educating courts through witnesses at trial, and — as 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance exemplifies — we need to structure new systems 
for educating judges that do the job but somehow guard against unre-
liable information. 
Reforms at home could take any number of shapes inspired by 
P.R.I.M.E. Finance.  For one thing, amicus briefs could be coordinated 
by those with particular incentives to remain credible.  I have previ-
ously suggested this role for members of the Supreme Court bar (re-
peat players to whom the Justices look for guidance and who carefully 
guard their reputations).21  Even beyond that Court, though, nonprof-
its could form as clearinghouses for this sort of factual information — 
perhaps monitored by groups (like professional associations) who also 
have incentives to be seen by judges and the Justices as credible.  
P.R.I.M.E. Finance is successful, in large part, because of its earned 
reputation for being objective and truthful.  Similarly, institutional ac-
tors invested in a reputation market are less likely to overreach on fac-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 Meijer & Perera – de Wit, supra note 12, at 157. 
 19 Golden, supra note 13, at 328. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Larsen & Devins, supra note 8, at 145–46. 
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tual assertions for the sake of advocacy.  To be sure, there are down-
sides to endowing certain groups with the power to educate courts; 
steps would need to be taken to ensure that those with the judges’ ear 
are careful and prove trustworthy.  But the point for now is that the 
insight behind P.R.I.M.E. Finance can be generalized: if judges are 
hungry for factual information beyond what the adversarial system is 
providing, we should make sure they are going to the right people to 
find it. 
A TURN TO QUASI-SPECIALIZED COURTS 
If one solution to the challenges of modern judicial factfinding is to 
provide specialized knowledge to generalist judges, then another move 
could be the reverse: to channel cases that require such expertise to 
judges who have it already.  This is not a novel suggestion.  In the 
United States, some areas of federal law are already funneled through 
specialized courts: tax courts and bankruptcy courts (although not  
Article III courts) are specialized by subject matter, and the Federal 
Circuit hears all patent appeals.  Still other areas of the law — busi-
ness disputes, social security benefit adjudications, and health law — 
have all been the subject of calls for specialized courts.22  And of 
course states have experimented with a range of different types of spe-
cialized courts — drug, juvenile, and family courts.23 
Yet the call for specialized courts is not without controversy.  In a 
lecture on the issue, Chief Judge Diane Wood explained the critique: 
“Generalist judges cannot become technocrats; they cannot hide be-
hind specialized vocabulary and ‘insider’ concerns.  The need to ex-
plain even the most complex area to the generalist judge (and often to 
a jury as well) forces the bar to demystify legal doctrine and to make 
the law comprehensible.”24  This is a powerful warning against the 
temptation to specialize and an important reminder about the value of 
the generalist judge. 
Perhaps there is a way to have it both ways — to preserve the 
hallmark of generalist judges but to promote specialized knowledge 
within those courts.  In 2015, the United Kingdom came up with just 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 228 (2011); see also Ad Hoc Comm. on 
Bus. Courts, Am. Bar Ass’n, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. L. 947 
(1997); Nora Freeman Engstrom, A Dose of Reality for Specialized Courts: Lessons from the 
VICP, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1631, 1633–35 (2015). 
 23 Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal 
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1591 (2012); Tamar M. Meekins, “Specialized Justice”: The Over-
Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.7 (2006). 
 24 Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1767 
(1997). 
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such a hybrid solution: the government created a “financial list” of 
judges who had handled “financial claims of £50 million or more, or 
cases that raise issues concerning the domestic and international finan-
cial markets.”25  The goal of creating such a list was to “ensure that 
cases which would benefit from being managed and heard by a Judge 
with particular expertise and experience in the law relating to the fi-
nancial markets, or which raise issues of general importance to the fi-
nancial markets, are dealt with by Judges with suitable expertise and 
experience.”26  Twelve such judges were named to the initial list.27  
These judges have since been educated regularly on the ins and outs of 
issues important to financial markets.  The parties to a dispute are ex-
pected to ask together if they want their case heard by a judge on the 
financial list.28  If they do, one will be appointed to their case by the 
Chancellor of the High Court and the Judge in Charge of the Com-
mercial Court (who are in turn accountable to the Lord Chief Jus-
tice).29  The normal appellate process applies. 
The financial list is the United Kingdom’s response to a call for 
specialized financial courts, but it stops short of creating courts that 
hear only one type of case — perhaps avoiding the pitfalls highlighted 
by Chief Judge Wood.  Could the U.S. judiciary set up such a list even 
outside the context of financial disputes?  Certainly there must be 
some judges who have had repeat exposure to, for example, complicat-
ed immigration law questions, or the psychological development of 
minors, or pharmacology lessons in connection with challenges to le-
thal injection.  Once a judge gets up to speed on complex technical is-
sues like these, it seems a shame to just let that knowledge go to waste.  
Creating content-based specialized lists of judges would create quasi-
specialized courts — capturing the upsides of specialization while pre-
serving the virtues of the generalist.  Particularly if party control is 
preserved (meaning it remains up to the parties in a case whether to 
request a judge from such a list), this reform could prove a healthy 
way to modify the educating function of the adversary system without 
abandoning it altogether. 
* * * 
We can surely debate the merits or feasibility of both of these re-
forms, but the most important point is that we need to actually have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 History, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the 
-judiciary/going-to-court/high-court/financial-list/history/ [https://perma.cc/CUR2-PWLE]. 
 26 Financial List: FAQ, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www 
.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/financial-list-faq/ [https://perma.cc/L9BJ-VP8Q]. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See id. 
 29 Id. 
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that conversation.  Technology has changed so much about the way we 
live, and it has completely transformed the way we consume facts 
about the world.  It is a mistake to ignore these changes in the judicial 
context.  The challenges to judging in the information age are global 
challenges, and we should not be shy about looking abroad when 
searching for creative solutions. 
